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Abstract 
This report documents the performance of the Banco Agricola (BAGRICOLA) of 
the Dominican Republic, highlighting features that have weakened its autonomy and 
financial viability. The macroeconomic environment within which the bank has operated 
in the mid to late 1980s is reviewed in detail along with the changing structure of the 
country's financial markets. The bank's financial performance is analyzed during the 1980s 
underlining the principal factors behind its shortage of liquidity and operational losses. A 
systematic analysis of the non-performing loan portfolio is undertaken, followed by 
recommendations to improve its financial viability for the future. 
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ON THE VIABILITY OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS: 
BANCO AGRICOLA DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA1 
by 
Douglas H. Graham, Jeffrey Poyo, and Nelson Aguilera2 
I. Introduction 
The Banco Agricola of the Dominican Republic (BAGRICOLA) reflects the classic 
features of an unviable agricultural development bank. This lack of viability has grown out 
of an unfavorable macroeconomic environment that has penalized the bank's earnings as 
well as of agricultural sector policies that have penalized the bank's customers. Government 
and international donor targeting of credit to high-risk and default-prone clientele have 
further weakened incentives for the bank to incorporate internal administrative procedures 
and practices to protect its financial viability. This report sets forth evidence on 
1 This paper was prepared for the Office of External Review and Evaluation (ORE) 
of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), as background material for the 
Study of the IDB's Experience with Institutional Strengthening Assistance, under the 
direction of Francisco Guzman. The authors are solely responsible for the views 
expressed here, which may or may not be shared by the sponsoring institution. 
2 Douglas H. Graham is Professor of Agricultural Economics and Director of the Latin 
American Studies Program at The Ohio State University. Jeffrey Poyo is Researcher 
and Resident Advisor to Ohio State's Rural Financial Services Project in the 
Dominican Republic. Nelson Aguilera is a Doctoral candidate in Agricultural 
Economics at The Ohio State University. The study follows the conceptual 
framework developed by Claudio Gonzalez-Vega in "On the Viability of Agricultural 
Development Banks: Conceptual Framework" and in "Evaluating the Viability of 
Agricultural Development Banks: A Methodology," unpublished reports for the IDB, 
April, 1990. The authors are grateful for comments by Claudio Gonzalez-Vega and 
Francisco Guzman. 
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BAGRICOLA's recent performance and highlights the features that have weakened its 
autonomy and viability. 
The first section of the report examines the deteriorating macroeconomic 
environment and increasing fiscal and current account deficits that have characteri~ed the 
Dominican economy from the mid-1980s to the present. A worsening environment and 
accelerating inflation have affected the performance of BAGRICOLA as well as of its 
clientele. This section is followed by an analysis of the highly fragmented financial markets 
of the countryt in which BAGRICOLA plays a role as one of the more specialized 
institutions in these markets. The growing disarray of these financial markets is evident 
from the mid-1980s to the present, through the uncontrolled expansion of numerous 
financial institutions and unregulated participants in these markets including holding 
companies for disparate financial intermediaries (groups). The lack of effective prudential 
supervision of financial institutions stands out, along with sporadic efforts to control interest 
rates on deposits and selected loan activities. Increasing reserve requirements on bank 
deposits have further repressed the regulated financial intermediaries. 
The third section sets forth a financial analysis of BAGRICOLA itself. Operating 
losses highlight its recent record, with a growing delinquent portfolio of loans exacerbated 
by an erosion of the real value of its outstanding portfolio through the impact of inflation. 
Inflation has further reduced the value of interest earnings based on negative real rates of 
interest. As a result, the bank has been experiencing growing liquidity shortages and has 
found it difficult to continue its on-lending from its shrinking capital base. 
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Next, systematic analysis of the non-performing loan portfolio of BAGRICOLA is 
undertaken. This section underscores the inappropriate and misleading delinquency and 
default indicators used by the bank. The seriousness of the delinquency problem has been 
. 
systematically underestimated, leading bank officials to a false sense of security. The role 
of the government and international donors such as the IDB in aggravating this situation is 
highlighted. The final section summarizes the findings and includes a set of recommenda-
tions for the bank, the government, and donors to consider in order to allow BAGRICOLA 
a reasonable set of options to gain greater financial viability for the future. 
II. Macroeconomic Environment 
Table 1 sets forth the relevant macroeconomic indicators for the Dominican Republic 
from 1985 through 1988. Increasing fiscal deficits and rising inflation characterize this 
period. 
Table 1. Dominican Republic: Macroeconomic Indicators 1985-1988 
Growth Annual Rate Public Sector Current Current 
Real GDP of Change Deficit Account Account 
of Consumer (% GDP) Deficit Deficit 
Prices (Millions US) (% GDP) 
% 
1985 -2.6 28.4 2.4 200.0 4.5 
1986 3.2 6.5 6.6 206.6 3.8 
1987 7.2 25.0 4.9 346.1 6.9 
1988 1.1 57.6 6.6 131.4 2.9 
Sources: Central Bank of the Dominican Republic, IMF statistics. 
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With the election of Dr. Joaquin Balaguer on May 16th, 1986 the Central Govern-
ment embarked on an ambitious public investment program, in an effort to reduce 
unemployment and increase economic growth. As a result of these policies real growth of 
GOP rose to 7.2 percent during 1987, from a rate of growth of 3.2 percent in 1986. 
Inflationary pressures began to mount, however, with prices rising 6.5 percent in 1986 and 
25 percent in 1987. The current account deficit in the balance of payments, which had 
reached 3.8 percent of GOP in 1986, rose to almost 7 percent by the end of 1987. The 
government financed this deficit with a fall in international monetary reserves and with 
payment arrears to international creditors. By 1988 real growth of GOP stagnated, with the 
inflation rate reaching almost 58 percent on a 12-month basis. 
The deficit of the consolidated public sector, which stood at 4.9 percent of GDP in 
1987, rose to 6.6 percent, as Central Bank losses grew, primarily as a result of exhange rate 
subsidies. Although the budget of the Central Government has remained in balance or with 
a slight deficit, the operating losses of the decentralized institutions (the Electric company, 
Banco Agricola, Molinos Dominicanos) have represented a serious drain on public sector 
finances. The rapid growth in aggregate demand which resulted from the government's 
policies led to the rapid depreciation of the Dominican peso during 1987 and 1988. This 
culminated in the adoption of exchange rate policies which alternated from freely floating 
rates to managed rates dictated by the Central Bank. As a result of a significant rise in the 
exchange rate in the free market, in August of 1988 the Monetary Board established a 
system in which all foreign exchange had to be surrendered to the Central Bank at a rate 
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of 6.28 pesos per dollar (Sistema de Registro de Divisas). This system led to a degree of 
stability in the exchange markets during the following 10 months. 
During 1989 real growth of GDP remained stagnant, with inflationary pressures 
subsiding to an annual rate of 42.2 percent. The need to finance the public sector deficit 
led to the rapid growth of domestic credit by the banking system. In addition, credit to the 
private sector continued to expand rapidly, as commercial banks failed to comply with 
reserve requirements. Although the new exchange rate system implemented in August 1988 
explicitly contemplated variation of the exchange rate, in response to variations in inflation 
in the Dominican Republic relative to its major trading partners, the Executive would not 
allow its readjustment during an election year. The Central Bank was unable to supply the 
demand for dollars at the official exchange rate and the margin between the official and the 
black market rate widened. By the third quarter of 1989 the country was facing a foreign 
exchange crisis. The spread between the official and black market exhange rates stood at 
about 40 percent by the end of 1989, and by April 1990 it had reached over 60 percent, 
while a growing proportion of imports, close to 80 percent, had to be undertaken at black 
market rates. In an effort to slow the growth of domestic credit, during the last quarter of 
1989 the Central Bank took strong measures to ensure that the commercial banks would 
comply with declared reserve requirements, by limiting their access to Central Bank credit. 
This pressure on the part of the Central Bank has created a serious liquidity crisis within 
the banking system over the past months, which has seriously undermined the confidence 
of the depositing public. 
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Although the demand for credit from the public sector declined somewhat during 
1989, credit to the private sector continued to expand rapidly. While the prices of some 
public services have been raised, implicit subsidies have widened, as the official exchange 
rate has become highly overvalued. The government tried to hold the line on publi~ sector 
wages, leading to a two-day strike which paralyzed the entire country in June, 1989. As a 
result, real wage rates sharply fell during 1988 and 1989. The economic environment also 
reflected an extreme degree of uncertainty, as a result of the May, 1990 presidential 
elections. 
The government continues to maintain price controls on some products in the 
consumer basket, but its ability to enforce these controls has been sharply undermined. 
Rice marketing has been transfered completely to the private sector, allowing supply and 
demand to determine its price. Despite the lack of enforcement of domestic price controls, 
the government continues to import foodstuffs, which are then sold below market prices. 
These policies have a major negative impact on domestic producers. 
III. The Structure of Financial Markets 
Financial markets in the Dominican Republic are highly fragmented, characterized 
by a large number of specialized financial institutions. The regulatory philosophy 
dominating the present market structure has sought to fix prices and isolate the different 
institutions from competition, out of a concern for the alledged safety of the system. The 
regulatory framework has evolved very slowly in response to changes in the economy and, 
as a consequence, this has led to the development of a large segment of non-regulated 
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financial institutions. Due to statutory ceilings on nominal interest rates, participants in the 
market have been induced to circumvent regulations by the use of various schemes that 
further hinder competition through a lack of information for the consumer. Established and 
well functiomng capital markets do not exist in the Dominican Republic. 
The financial market is dominated by private sector institutions, which are made up 
of 23 commercial banks, 36 private development banks, 16 mortgage banks, 20 savings and 
loan associations, approximately 600 finance companies (financieras) that finance medium 
and small size firms and consumer loans, and 76 small loan companies (casas de prestamos 
de menor cuantia) which specialize in the same type of operations. There also exist several 
credit card institutions, 50 insurance companies, and a few dozen credit unions. In addition, 
there are thousands of pawn shop operations throughout the country. Non~profit 
foundations, associations, and private volunteer organizations have also been formed to 
reach specific target groups, such as micro-entrepreneurs, women, or rural peasants. 
The public sector has one commercial bank (Banco de Reservas ), one development 
bank (Banco Agricola), a central housing bank (Banco Nacional de la Vivienda), one 
industrial development corporation (Corporacion de Fomento Industrial), one consumer 
loan company which operates quite similar to a pawn shop (Caja de Ahorros y Monte 
Piedad), and a cooperative development agency (IDECOOP). 
Many different types of financial institutions are linked through larger holding 
companies ( Grupos Financieros ). The formation of these groups by the private sector bas 
become a way to overcome the inherent risks of institutional specialization, to partially avoid 
regulation, and to gain access to subsidized funding available only through specific 
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institutional types. Regulations which set extremely low ceilings on interest rates paid on 
different savings instruments have made the establishment of a financial institution to 
capture these savings a profitable means to in turn issue loans for the non-financial firms 
in the group. In addition, the highly subsidized "development" funds at the Centra' Bank 
(FIDE and INFRATUR), as well as tax exemptions have constituted a powerful incentive 
for the establishment of private development banks operated by these holding companies, 
in order to further become eligible for access to subsidized funds. Dominican banking 
regulations do not adequately address the regulatory needs which arise out of the existence 
of these financial holding companies. Insider dealing has become a serious problem, and 
a major financial crisis has already developed with two of these groups (Grupo Finandero 
Bancibao, Grupo Dominico-Hispano ). 
Financial services in the Dominican Republic are highly concentrated in large urban 
centers such as Santo Domingo and Santiago. Only the Banco Agricola and the Banco de 
Reservas have had an important presence in rural communities in past decades. In recent 
years, however, there has been a rapid growth in the number of branch offices and agencies 
of private commercial banks operating in smaller secondary towns. The rapid growth in the 
number of financial institutions and the lure of mobilizing highly subsidized savings and 
checking accounts have fueled this expansion. While this growth in branches has somewhat 
improved the access to deposit facilities for the local population, it has not led to a 
significant improvement in the access to credit services by the rural population, as a large 
proportion of the funds mobilized are transfered to the large urban centers. The degree of 
geographic concentration of financial seiVices remains verb high, despite these developments. 
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Some efforts at partial reforms of financial markets began in 1985, in conjunction 
with a Stand-By Agreement with the International Monetary Fund. These efforts have been 
half-hearted, and have not advanced financial markets towards improved competition, 
transparency, and security. Banking supervision and examination is inadequate, due to 
various structural and legal limitations of the institutions charged with this responsibility 
(Superintendency of Banks and the Monetary Board of the Central Bank). Interest rates 
on large financial certificates were raised and regulation of commercial financieras was 
instituted. These finance companies have been forced to register with the Superintendency 
of Banks, in addition to complying with reserve requirements and interest rate ceilings. 
These institutions have retained a regulatory advantage with regard to the rest of the 
financial system, nevertheless, because of lower reserve requirements. Although most 
financieras have registered with the Superintendency, this institution does not have the 
capability to effectively supervise their operations. The financieras are taking advantage of 
this registration to convince the public that they are now "regulated", and thus less risky 
deposit institutions for their savings. However, nominal registration combined with 
ineffective prudential supervision hardly reduces the risk to the depositing public. 
The financial system in the Dominican Republic is in a state of disarray because of 
the lack of clear direction in the reforms undertaken by the Central Bank and the 
Superintendency of Banks. The crisis of various commercial finance companies was resolved 
by allowing the purchase of these financial intermediaries by regulated banking institutions, 
with rediscounts by the Central Bank as a "sweetener". Some of the commercial banks 
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which later developed serious liquidity problems were among those that participated in 
purchasing insolvent finance companies. 
IV. Financial Viability and Institutional Strengthening of the Banco Agricola 
1. Introduction 
The Banco Agricola (BAGRICOLA) is the most important financial institution 
serving the rural areas in the Dominican Republic. It's mandate (Ley De Fomento A&ricola 
No. 6186) specializes the bank's credit operations in agricultural and livestock activities. As 
a state-owned bank with 32 branch offices and 39 "satellite" offices, it is the most important 
instrument of the government's agricultural sector policies? In the past, the Bank: has 
played a central role serving as an conduit for multilateral and bilateral lending institutions. 
However, it has not signed a major loan agreement with any international lending institution 
since its most recent loan for $36.5 million dollars with the InterAmerican Development 
bank (IDB) in 1982. In recent years it has also played a major role in transferring rice 
marketing from the price stabilization board (INESPRE) to private market intermediaries. 
The bank is currently going through the most significant institutional and financial 
transformation of its 40 year history as a result of reduced funding from external donor 
institutions .. 
Despite its rather large size, BAGRICOLA is able to service only a small proportion 
of the total credit demand in the agricultural sector. Funding restictions as well as the 
3 The operations of the satellite offices have been established in the sma11er towns in 
order to reduce the transactions costs for the borrowers and savers. 
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progressive decapitalization of its loan portfolio have severely undermined its presence in 
the rural economy. According to published statistics, BAGRICOLA contributed about 45 
percent of the banking system lending to the agricultural sector in 1988. This participation 
declined consistently over the past ten years, from a high of 65 percent at the end of the 
1970s to its current level.4 The onset of inflationary pressures in the 1980s and an excessive 
loan delinquency have been responsible for the large decline in the real size of the bank's 
portfolio. During the past few years, new funding has come almost entirely from domestic 
sources, as a result of the loss of access to international lending institutions. In 1984 the 
bank began to mobilize deposits from the public and has accumulated RD$ 59 million pesos 
in deposits.5 In addition, over the last four years it has received more than RD$500 million 
of capital injections from the Central Government and the Central Bank. 
The bank has been suffering from a serious problem with its image among bilateral 
and multilateral lending agencies as well as with several government institutions. In part, 
its poor image has grown out of excessive borrower delinquency and political intrusion, such 
as the public pardoning of loans totalling RD$ 60 million by the Salvador Jorge Blanco 
administration in 1985. In addition, obsolete operating procedures and poor information 
management systems have undermined the reliability and timeliness of financial information 
provided by the bank. 
4 See "Informe de Evaluaci6n Institucional y Financiera del Banco Agricola de la 
Republica Dominicana, Perfodo 1982-1988," Departamento de Programaci6n, 
Secci6n de Evaluaci6n y Seguimiento Programas de Credito, Banco Agricola, Santo 
Domingo, Mayo 1989. 
5 Deposit mobilization was introduced in the bank by The Ohio State University's 
Rural Deposit Mobi1ization project. 
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2. Financial Analysis of the Banco Agricola 
This section identifies the major variables that affect the financial viability of the 
bank. Different measures of financial viability are presented that highlight the problem of 
financial self-sufficiency. Institutional reforms currently being carried out to improye the 
financial viability of the institution are reviewed along with the role that the political milieu 
plays in undermining its financial position. 
During the 1980s Banco Agricola has experienced a severe financial contraction in 
the real size of its portfolio, as is evident in Chart 1.6 When compared to the levels 
attained before the hurricane in 1979, the bank's real portfolio had declined by 31.4 percent 
from the end of 1978 to 1986 as seen in the right side smaller histograms for each year in 
Chart 1 which represent constant pesos in contrast to the current peso histograms on the left 
side. Despite a massive growth in current pesos between 1986 and 1988, the bank's real 
portfolio has witnessed only moderate expansion, as a result of high rates of inflation. In 
1989 the Bank registered a slight increase in the real value of lending, but this was still well 
below the levels of the early 1980s. 
The severe decapitalization of the bank's portfolio has been caused primarily by 
excessive loan delinquency, negative real rates of interest in the face of rising inflation, and, 
to a lesser extent, upon relatively high operating costs. The growing domestic inflation and 
devaluation of the Dominican peso during the 1980s raised the costs of agricultural 
6 The bank's real size is somewhat overstated in 1980 as a result of the infusion of 
resources during the 1979 hurricane. The massive amount of the emergency funding 
overwhelmed the institution's capacity to effectively administer it and the bank thus 
became a conduit for humanitarian aid. 
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Chart 1 
production, thereby limiting the bank's ability to service the same number of farmers or to 
finance the same physical area. Focusing on crop loans in Chart 2, we observe the effects 
of the massive decapitalization measured in hectares financed with annual loan disburseme-
nts. Due to the political importance attached to self-sufficiency in rice production during 
the period from 1980 to 1986, other crops were rationed out of the loan portfolio to make 
room for rice producers within a shrinking real portfolio. The distribution of total area 
financed for rice production rose from 22 percent in 1980 to 49 percent in 1986. 
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Chart 2 
During 1987 there was a significant recovery in the area financed by BAGRICOLA 
as a result of increased funding from the Central Government and the Central Bank. 
Despite this increase in resources, in 1988 and 1989 the real portfolio continued to stagnate. 
In addition, during the past two years a large proportion of the new funding was used to 
finance medium and long term investment projects. This has seriously compromised the 
institution's ability to adequately fund the short cycle crops of basic grains. 
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The statistics on loan delinquency in the bank have always been deficient. In the 
past, only those loans in which all payments had fallen due were classified as delinquent. 
Current medium and long term loans with installment arrears were not included as 
delinquent, since they had not yet completed their term maturity. In addition, several loan 
classifications were created ( diferido, prorrogado ), in which delinquent loans due to "natural 
factors" were rescheduled into non-delinquent postponed current loans at the discretion of 
branch managers. Finally, the practice of transferring delinquent agrarian reform loans to 
"accounts receivable" from the Central Government further contributed to seriously distort 
these statistics and disguise the true state of loan delinquency. 
Although some of the loan classifications used to reduce delinquency have been 
eliminated, serious problems are still apparent. Specifically, the transfer of delinquent loans 
to accounts payable by the Central Government continues. Therefore, although aggregate 
loan delinquency, conventionally measured (total arrears over total loans outstanding), has 
shown a significant decline over the past few years, this fall has been primarily due to three 
factors: the result of the rapid growth in the loan portfolio with new long term loans not yet 
due, a lengthening in the term maturity of loans, and greater efforts in the area of loan 
collection for those loans in delinquent status. It is impossible to determine from these 
aggregate statistics which of these factors has been most important. In addition, because 
of frequent changes in the definition of delinquency, comparisons over time are rendered 
impossible. It is estimated that over the past few years delinquency has probably fluctuated 
from 20 to 40 percent of the outstanding loan portfolio. A more detailed and revealing 
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Chart 3 
Chart 4 
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analysis of loan delinquency will be undertaken in the final section of this report, using a 
more rigorous and consistent definition of arrears. 
As of June 1989 the bank had accumulated over DR$ 6 million in operating losses . 
. 
These losses have been due to a declining and even negative real interest rate spread, that 
has resulted from greater dependence on domestic sources of finance which, unlike external 
funding, carry interest charges.7 Between December of 1984 and June of 1989 the equity 
multiplier (total assets/equity) increased from 1.94 to 3.44, demostrating the greater reliance 
on liabilities in funding the loan portfolio. In addition to greater reliance on funding from 
interest bearing liabilities, the interest costs of these liabilities have increased as a result of 
rising inflation. As shown in Chart 3, the annualized interest on domestic liabilities has 
increased from about 3 to 8 percent, between the end of 1986 and 1989. 
The operating losses which accumulated during 1989 were the result of increasing 
financial costs without a compensating increase in interest income. Chart 4 presents the 
effective interest in,come (interest and commissions) on the bank's loan portfolio between 
January 1987 and June 1989. Despite the fact that the bank has been charging simple 
interest plus commissions between 17 and 19 percent on its loans, this only generated about 
10 cents earnings on every peso in their portfolio. 
7 The IDB loans, which have been the major source of funding for BAGRICOLA in 
the past, have been provided as capital by the Central Government. Although the 
Dominican Government has contracted a loan with the IDB, the Banco Agricola has 
received the domestic currency with no interest cost or repayment obligation to the 
Central Government. This has been an unfortunate practice, since it destroys 
incentives for efficiency at BAGRICOLA. 
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Table 2 
Banco Agricola 
Interest and Comission Charges 
on Agricultural Production Loans 
Year Interest Commissions Total 
1980 10 2 12 
1981 10 2 12 
1982 11 2 13 
1983 12 2 14 
1984 12 4 16 
1985 12 5 17 
1986 12 5 17 
1987 12 6 18 
1988 12 6 18 
1989 12 18 30 
--------------------------------------------
Source: "Informe de Evaluaci6n 
Institucional y Financiera del Banco 
Agrfcola de la Republica Dominicana 
Perfodo 1982-1988", Banco Agricola, 
Santo Domingo, May 1989. 
As can be seen in Table 2, total charges on loans, including interest and commissions, 
have risen considerably since 1984 with the onset of domestic inflationary pressures. 
However, the bank has been effectively earning only about 10 percent on its interest income. 
This limited income has been due to a combination of a large number of non-performing 
loans in the portfolio, which have reduced interest income, and to the role of longer term 
loans, that were disbursed prior to the major interest rate reforms of the last four years.8 
8 Information on the distribution of the loan portfolio by interest rates and commis-
sions could not be obtained. However, over the past few years the loans formalized 
by the bank have been concentrated in short term rice production. This would seem 
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Chart 5 illustrates what has happened to the interest spread on the bank's loan portfolio 
over the 30 months between January 1987 and August 1989.9 This spread, which subtracts 
interest charges on deposits from interest income has been declining in recent years. 
Chart 5 
to suggest that the limited interest income earned on the loan portfolio has been 
primarily due to loan delinquency, rather than the lower rates of interest on long 
term loans disbursed in the late 1970s. 
9 The interest spread is defined as the ratio of interest income and commissions minus 
interest paid over the average loan portfolio. 
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In the face of these difficulties, in September of 1989 BAGRICOLA significantly 
revised its interest rate structure, increasing total interest charges (primarily through 
increased commissions) from 17-19 to 30-32 percent per annum (see Table 2). Since many 
of the comissions are charged up front, however, the effective rates of interest hav:e risen 
above 40 percent on short term loans. Depending on the term of the loan, the effective 
interest charges may be in fact positive in real terms, considering that the 12-month inflation 
was approximately 42 percent during 1989. This reform has permitted the bank to increase 
significantly its interest income during the first quarter of 1990. It is expected that this 
policy will eventually have a positive impact on the bank's earnings, but this action will only 
alter its financial position significantly when the bank is able to address its loan delinquency 
problem. 
Operating costs in the bank have been rising due to inflation (see Table 3, panel A). 
Salary and non-personnel costs, as a proportion of the portfolio or total assets, have actually 
been declining (see panels Band C). Contributions to the retirement fund increased nine 
fold between 1988 and 1989, to replace the depletion of this fund in past years. At the same 
time, bad loan write-offs also increased significantly in the past two years, to make up for 
extended defaults accumulated from previous years. When one reviews the trends in 
operational costs in constant pesos (panel D), it is apparent that the increase in these costs 
in real terms is not associated with personnel or conventional non-personnel costs. The lack 
of profitability is associated with the large number of non-performing loans (evident in the 
write-offs) undermining the income streams (i.e. interest earnings) of the bank, in the face 
of rising interest costs evident in panel D. 
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Table 3 
Operating Costs of Banco Agricola in Current and Constant Pesos 
and Total Assets and as a Percent of the Loan Portfolio 
Average Loan Portfolio 
Average Total Assets 
Salaries + Benefits 
Contribution to Retirement 
Non-Personel Costs 
Portfolio Write Off 
Interest + Commissions 
Total Expenditures 
Salaries + Benefits 
Contribution to Retirement 
Non-Personel Costs 
Portfolio Write Off 
Interest + Commissions 
Total Expenditures 
Salaries + Benefits 
Contribution to Retirement 
Non-Personel Costs 
Portfolio Write Off 
Interest + Commissions 
Total Expenditures 
Salaries + Benefits 
Contribution to Retirement 
Non-Personel Costs 
Portfolio Write Off 
Interest + Commissions 
Total Expenditures 
and Total Assets, 1987-1989 
A. Current Operating Costs 
1987 1988 
(1) (2) 
354,149,437 529,849,233 
560,523,525 819,481,810 
21,125,398 28,279,713 
1,682,288 2,160,342 
7,290,984 12,312,494 
0 38,000,000 
6,980,627 13,986,755 
37,080,297 94,839,304 
B. Total Costs as a Percent of Average Portfolio 
5.97% 
0.48% 
2.06% 
0.00% 
1.97% 
10.47% 
5.36% 
0.41% 
2.32% 
7.17% 
2.64% 
17.90% 
C. Total Costs as a Percent of Average Total A.~sets 
3.77% 
0.30% 
1.30% 
0.00% 
1.25% 
6.62% 
D. Constant Operating Costs (Base 1976-77) 
5,743,835 
457,380 
1,982,269 
0 
1,897,889 
10,081,373 
3.46% 
0.26% 
1.50% 
4.64% 
1.71% 
11.57% 
5,342,265 
406,668 
2,317,733 
7,153,210 
2,632,900 
17,852,776 
1989 
(3) 
794,253,550 
1,174,455.089 
40,476,932 
18,234,992 
17,062,348 
180,012,981 
33,727,945 
289,515,198 
5.12%.· 
2.30% 
2.16% 
22.75% 
4.26% 
36.59% 
3.45% 
1.55% 
1.45% 
15.33% 
2.87% 
24.65% 
5,239,664 
2,360,486 
2,2011,690 
23,302,350 
4,366,021 
37,477,210 
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3. Institutional Incentives 
The major problem facing BAGRICOLA with regard to its financial viability is its 
serious loan delinquency problem. In several studies on the subject, the bank has identified 
its own obsolete operating procedures (credit analysis, supervision, and loan recovery ~fforts) 
as the single most important variable affecting loan delinquency and default. The lack of 
profitability of the agricultural sector due to public sector pricing policies and natural 
phenomena has also played an important role in reducing the profitability of its clients 
activities. 
Obsolete operational and information systems have aggravated the loan delinquency 
problem. The lack of clearly specified and consistent institutional objectives~ emphasizing 
financial viability have contributed to this deficiency. From its establishment through the 
beginning of the 1980s the bank enjoyed ample access to external donor funds. Its major 
creditors (the Inter-American Development Bank, the Agency for International Develop-
ment, and the World Bank) have traditionally been concerned with the "impact" of their 
subsidized credit programs on the welfare of the borrowing clientele, and consequently have 
paid little attention to the institution's financial viability.10 These external loans were 
contracted directly with the Central Government, whose major incentive was to obtain 
access to foreign exchange at a highly subsidized rate of interest, to alleviate its shortage of 
foreign exchange. The Central Government then provided the equivalent local currency to 
10 The emphasis placed on impact studies responded to the bureaucratic incentives 
within donor institutions to demonstrate that their loan programs were raising the 
incomes of the poor. 
23 
the bank, in the form of capital appropriations from the Central Government's budget or 
even from monetary creation. 
Officials of the bank have had an incentive to negotiate access to these resources 
under the most favorable conditions and, as a result, BAGRICOLA has been funding most 
of its operations from capital provided by the Central Government. This meant that the 
bank was never placed in a position to have to make repayments of principal or interest for 
the use of these donor-sourced resources. Everything the bank recovered was used to make 
new loans and to cover operating costs. The impact of the bank's delinquency on its annual 
disbursements was hidden by new capital injections every year. Once the fresh funds were 
no longer forthcoming, however, decapitalization of the bank became a serious obstacle for 
the continued financing of agricultural production. 
According to the Ley de Fomento Agricola No. 6186, the bank is expected to provide 
credit for agrarian reform beneficiaries. This was to be financed from the Fondo de 
Operaciones Especiales and funds provided by the Central Government from annual budgets 
earmarked for this purpose. In practice, however, BAGRICOLA has been forced to make 
loans from its own resources. This has thereby transferred a fiscal function to the Banco 
Agricola that properly belongs in the budget of the Central Government. When these loans 
become delinquent, the bank transfers them to accounts collectible from the Government 
(Article 52 of the law which creates the Dominican Agrarian Institute). 
The practice of mixing sound commercial loans with these social welfare "loans" has 
created a serious problem of moral hazard (excessive risk taking) within the lending 
operations of the bank. Since the loans for agrarian reform beneficiaries are guaranteed 
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by the State, the bank repeatedly funds marginal agrarian reform projects, as well as loans 
to individual farmers, that may already have a past record of delinquent loans. As these 
delinquent "social" loans have grown rapidly in recent years and the responsibility for loan 
recovery may have become more relaxed, delinquency and staff morale have be~ome a 
problem for the bank. 
V. Loan Repayment Problems in Banco Agricola 
Given the predominant role that non-performing (delinquent) loans play in creating 
the liquidity problems and growing lack of financial viability of Banco Agricola, a separate 
study was undertaken by the Ohio State team to document this problem in detail. First, it 
is instructive to set forth the officially reported default data for the bank in Table 4. From 
this data it would appear that the bank is succeeding in addressing the problems of loan 
delinquency in that default, as measured by the bank, has declined from 21 percent in 1983 
to only 6.9 percent in 1988. There are important deficiencies in this measure, however. 
First, only loans that have completed their full term in default are classified as past due in 
column ( 1 ). All the remaining medium and long term loans that have yet to complete their 
term are excluded, even if a significant proportion of the on-going installment payments are 
in arrears. Second, the data in column (2) includes a large injection of new long term loans 
in recent years, many of which are not yet due. When the bank reports the ratio of column 
(1) over column (2) as a default index, it is inadvertantly hiding potentially serious default 
problems. Put differently, delinquency and default ratios should be based on the volume 
of arrears over the relevant portfolio that has fallen due, including delinquent installments. 
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It makes no sense to include in the denominator loan amounts that are not yet due. 
Furthermore, many delinquent loans have been rescheduled and thereby are classified as 
current (i.e. without arrears). 
Table 4 
Loan Default Index of the Agricultural Bank (BAGRICOLA) in 
the Dominican Republic, 1983-1988 
Loan Amount Default Index 
(DR Pesos) (percent) 
Year Pastdue Portfolio (1/2) 
(1) (2) (3) 
1. 1983 53,716,257 255,542,211 21.1 
2. 1984 48,296,325 243,190,640 19.9 
3. 1985 45,102,256 272,522,732 16.6 
4. 1986 53,558,211 280,461,565 19.1 
5. 1987 51,160,831 388,462,646 13.0 
6. 1988 43,848,321 633,929,335 6.9 
Source: Boletin Estadistico, 1987, Banco Agricola de la Republica 
Dominicana. 
To address this problem, the Ohio State team drew a random sample of loans issued 
in 1987 and tracked their performance over the succeeding two years (up to the end of 
August, 1989). The random sample of 3,455 loan dossiers from 18 representative branches 
amounted to approximately nine percent of the total number of loan applications in 1987. 
Of this total, 569 applications were rejected, 538 withdrawn by the loan applicants, and 2,251 
finally approved by the bank. 
In addition, the repayment status (as of August 31, 1989) of these approved loans 
issued in 1987 was classified according to six categories: 
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(1) complete or partial default (vencido) if the total loan or some installments of 
longer term loans were unpaid 30 days after the due date. Since a consider-
able number of these loans had already completed their term maturity by 
August 1989 one can refer to this category as representing hard core ~efault; 
(2) in litigation, if unpaid loans (or installments) were subject to legal collection 
procedures; 
(3) rescheduled, if the repayment period of the loan had been extended without 
altering the sum of principal and interest outstanding; 
(4) paid with arrears, for loans with completed term maturity if the loan or 
installments had been paid later than 30 days after the due date; 
(5) current, if loans or installments are not yet due; and 
(6) paid without arrears, if loans or installments had been paid within 30 days of 
the due date. 
Defaulting loans are just one dimension of the loan repayment problem faced by the 
institution in recent years. Installment arrears and the rescheduling of outstanding loans 
constitute another important dimension of the loan repayment problems faced by the bank. 
Hence, any meaningful analysis of the repayment performance of outstanding loans 
disbursed by development institutions must also analyze the incidence of rescheduling and 
installment arrears. 
The effects of different loan characteristics on loan repayment performance are 
presented here according to several cross classified variables with loan repayment. Detailed 
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loan repayment status is reported for the number and volume of loans granted by type of 
borrower, land tenancy, type of investment, source of funds, and type of collateral. 
Table 5 presents the aggregate data on repayment status for our total sample of loans 
issued in 1987. If we add up the four default and arrears categories, it is clear (in column 
3) that approximately 72 percent of the number of loans issued in 1987 had experienced 
some state of default or arrears. This is evidence of a serious loan recovery problem for the 
bank. Secondly, very few loans have fallen into litigation. This suggests that the bank tends 
to avoid the use of legal channels due to the costs and delays of drawing upon this 
instrument for collection. However, it is apparent that larger borrowers tend to fall into 
litigation as the average loan size for this default category is greater than those for the other 
classifications (see column 1). 
Finally, it is pertinent to underscore the seriousness of having 45 percent of the total 
sample of loans falling into hardcore default. The costs of recovering these loans many of 
which have completed their term in default would be high and the results problematical. 
It is now easier to understand why the bank has been experiencing liquidity problems and 
generating operational losses. The inability to secure reasonable loan repayments restricts 
the funding base for new loans (i.e., the liquidity problem), while the lack of interest 
earnings from defaulted loans contributes to operational losses. It is now instructive to see 
how this delinquency problem is reflected in specific borrower and loan characteristics. 
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Table 5 
Percentage Distribution of the On-Going Repayment Status as of August 1989 
of the Sample of Loans Disbursed in 1987 
Percentage of Percentage of 
the Volume the Number of 
Average Disbursed Loans 
Loan Size 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans D.R. 
Pesos % % 
Default 3,406.7 20.1 44.9 
In Litigation 10,561.0 0.4 0.2 
Rescheduled 5,274.1 4.1 5.4 
Paid with Arrears 6,429.4 33.0 21.9 
Current 6,154.5 11.6 10.2 
Paid without Arrears 2,267.2 8.8 16.7 
Borrower Tn>e Profile 
Information in Table 6 highlights the important incidence of poor loan recovery from 
agrarian reform beneficiaries, with individual reform beneficiaries performing more poorly 
than reform groups or associations. Column (1) underscores the greater incidence of 
completed term maturity default and partial default (before completed maturity) for 
agrarian reform borrowers both in terms of the number of loans or the volume disbursed. 
However, even individual non reform borrowers record poor repayment (in terms of the 
number of loans). The non-reform associations (both groups and firms) record the best loan 
repayment behavior. While the loan recovery record is poor throughout, it is clear that the 
agrarian reform borrowers represent a high risk, adverse clientele compromising the 
performance of the bank. 
Type of Borrower Category 
1. Non-Reform Individual 
2. Non-Reform Association 
3. Agrarian Reform Individual 
4. Agrarian Reform Association 
5. Other 
Type of Borrower Category 
1. Non-Reform Individual 
2. Non-Reform Association 
3. Agrarian Reform Individual 
4. Agrarian Reform Association 
5. Other 
Table 6 
Repayment Status by August 30th 1989 of the Sample of Loans Disbursed in 1987 
by Type of Borrowers 
A. Percentage of the Volume Disbursed 
Re~yment Status of Sample of Loans 
Paid 
Volume In With 
Disbursed Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears 
(000) Pesos 
" " " " 5597.92 20.2 0.5 3.5 31.6 
330.18 2.1 
- 16.1 58.8 
1244.35 31.8 0.7 10.0 26.2 
2325.29 17.9 - 1.4 37.9 
60.75 11.3 - - 82.3 
B. Percentage of the Number of Loans 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
Number of In Paid With 
Loans Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears 
" " " " 1737 42.0 0.1 4.4 23.9 
22 22.7 - 9.1 36.4 
462 57.4 0.5 9.5 13.9 
41 41.5 - 2.4 39.0 
10 80.0 - - 10.0 
Current 
" 17.8 
19.9 
4.5 
0.5 
1.8 
Current 
" 11.1 
18.2 
6.7 
9.8 
10.0 
Paid 
Without 
Arrears 
" 13.1 
2.4 
8.1 
1.0 
-
Paid Without 
Arrears 
" 18.5 
13.6 
12.0 
7.3 
-
N 
\0 
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Tenancy and Collateral Profile 
In Table 7 it becomes clear that tenancy is not a major factor separating good from 
bad borrowers (again with the exception of the agrarian reform cultivators). The hard core 
default indicators (in column 1) are high across all tenancy categories (for number of loans 
in default in panel B). It is interesting to note the relatively better performance of tenants 
and to a lesser extent for the "cedida" group (i.e. those who have been granted implicit title 
to their lands usually from extended family members). One would have thought that 
individual non-reform land owners would have performed markedly better than tenants and 
occupants of public lands. This is not the case. A probable explanation of this behavior lies 
in the nature of the collateral used by the bank to secure its loans. Ordinarily mortgage 
collateral should be expected to provide the incentive for good loan repayment for 
individual title holders. The fact that this does not occur in the Banco Agricola suggests 
that mortgage collateral is negligible in the bank's portfolio. 
This conclusion is confirmed in Table 8, where it can be seen that land title is 
practically non-existent as a form of collateral in the bank's loan contracts. "Prenda" (crop 
lien pledges) predominates and this is surely the weakest form of collateral to use to secure 
a loan. The pignoraticia collateral (crops or other inventory in effective control or storage 
by the bank) is another strong collateral instrument and, again, it is evident in Table 8 that 
the bank is unable to draw upon this form of collateral in its contracts. Table 9 presenting 
the loan repayment record by collateral suggests that the bi}nk would be better served if it 
could shift more of its Joan contracts into mortgage or pignoraticia guarantees. The default 
index is much higher for the crop lien (prenda) category than for these other minimally used 
Volume 
Disbursed 
Type of Land Tenancy C000) Pesos 
1. Private Land owner 2569.57 
2. Occupant of Public Land 2219.21 
3. Land Tenant 263.98 
4. CEDIDA 819.50 
5. Reform Land Owner 3478.14 
6. Other 176.58 
Loans 
Disbursed 
Type of Land Tenancy 
1. Private Land owner 635 
2. Occupant of Public Land 871 
3. Land Tenant 30 
4. CEDIDA 189 
5. Reform Land Owner 471 
L_6. Othf!f" __ 21 
--·-- ---
Table 7 
Repayment Status by August 30th 1989 of the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987 by Type of Land Tenancy 
A. Percentage of the Volume Disbursed 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
In Paid With 
Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears 
% % % % 
18.9 1.0 2.9 35.0 
22.9 - 6.9 23.3 
5.4 - 2.9 79.5 
14.1 0.1 1.4 39.1 
23.4 0.2 4.5 32.0 
4.2 - - 89.3 
B. Percentage of the Number of Loans 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
In Paid With 
Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears 
% % % % 
41.3 0.2 3.8 28.5 
42.4 - 5.2 19.7 
33.3 - 6.7 36.7 
37.6 0.5 3.7 28.6 
56.9 0.4 8.9 15.1 
33.3 - - 42.9 
Current 
% 
22.8 
14.5 
1.8 
18.0 
1.9 
-
Current 
% 
12.1 
11.5 
6.7 
9.0 
7.0 
-
Paid Without 
Arrears 
% 
8.3 
16.7 
8.7 
14.5 
3.6 
5.9 
Paid Without 
Arrears 
% 
14.2 
21.2 
16.7 
20.6 
11.7 
23.8 
• 
• 
w 
...... 
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Table 8 
Number, Amount, and Average Loan Size of the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987 by Type of Collateral 
Average 
Number of Loans Volume Disbursed Loan Size 
Type of Collateral N % (000) Pe- % (000) 
sos Pesos 
1. Mortgage 31 1.4 654.5 6.8 21.11 
2. Prenda 2210 98.2 8735.4 91.3 3.95 
3. Pignoraticia 10 0.4 179.0 1.9 17.90 
Total 2251 100.0 9568.9 100.0 4.25 
Volume 
Disbursed 
Type of Collateral (000) Pesos 
1. Mortgage 654.48 
2. Prenda 8726.82 
3. Pignoraticia 178.99 
Loans 
Type of Collateral Disbursed 
1. Mortgage 31 
2. Prenda 2204 
3. Pignoraticia 10 
Table 9 
Repayment Status by August 30th 1989 of the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987 by Type of Collateral 
A. Percentage of the Volume Disbursed 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
In Paid With 
Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears 
% % % % 
18.5 - - 28.9 
20.9 0.1 4.6 33.9 
8.2 14.9 - 41.3 
B. Percentage of the Number of Loans 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
In Paid With 
Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears 
% % % % 
22.6 - - 25.8 
45.4 0.1 5.4 22.1 
20.0 10.0 - 60.0 
Current 
% 
40.1 
9.5 
22.3 
Current 
% 
35.5 
9.8 
10.0 
Paid Without 
Arrears 
% 
9.4 
9.2 
-
Paid Without 
Arrears 
% 
16.1 
17.1 
-
w 
w 
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instruments. At the same time, it would be useful to explore why these other guarantee 
instruments are not used more and what, if anything, could be done to change this apparent 
built-in bias for crop lien guarantees. 
Loan :U~ Profile (Enterprise-Type) 
Data on repayment status by loan use in Table 10 highlights several interesting 
findings. Livestock activities rank high as default-prone loans both in terms of number and 
volume for hard core default in column (1). Industrial food crop borrowers perform best, 
with the lowest rate of default with agricultural export borrowers (coffee and cacao) and 
domestic food crop borrowers (rice, yucca, plantain, potatoes, and vegetables) falling in-
between. It is of interest to note that the highly default-prone livestock loans are associated 
with government funds allocated (i.e. targeted) for these activities. This finding highlights 
the high cost the bank incurs in being forced to channel loans to a high risk clientele which 
the bank otherwise would not be inclined to include in its portfolio. 
The second revealing result is the high rate of loans paid with arrears (column 4) 
precisely for the industrial food crop producers that recorded the lowest level of hardcore 
default in column (1). Thirty-nine percent of these borrowers registered delayed payments, 
which in turn constituted 81 percent arrears in terms of the volume disbursed in panel A of 
Table 10. This underscores the role that marketing problems play in compromising the 
bank's portfolio with arrears. These industrial food crop producers of tomatoes, pineapple, 
melons, and sorghum, sell their crops to processors who then delay payment to the farmers 
until after their product has been sold successfully down the marketing chain. Consequently, 
Vol1.111e 
Disbursed 
Type of Investment (000) Pesos 
1. Non Industrial Food Crop 4682.86 
2. Industrial Food Crop 1049.95 
3. Agricultural Export 668.72 
4. Livestock 2769.33 
5. Machinery & Equipment 346.93 
6. Other 43.30 
Loans 
Disbursed 
Type of Investment 
1. Non Industrial Food Crop 820 
2. Industrial Food Crop 108 
3. Agricultural Export 112 
4. Livestock 1151 
5. Machinery & Equipment 47 
6. Other 7 
Table 10 
Repayment Status by August 30th 1989 of the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987 by Type of Investment 
A. Percentage of the Volume Disbursed 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
In Paid With 
Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears 
% % % % 
18.6 0.7 7.2 28.0 
7.1 - 1.5 81.4 
16.2 - 0.9 54.5 
30.0 0.1 1.5 22.5 
18.2 - 1.4 16.9 
35.2 - - 24.7 
B. Percentage of the Number of Loans 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
In Paid With 
Default Litigation Rescheduled Arrears 
% % % % 
32.8 0.2 10.4 27.9 
25.9 - 4.6 38.99 
24.1 - 2.7 28.6 
57.4 0.2 2.3 16.4 
46.8 - 2.1 17.0 
42.9 - - 14.3 
Current 
% 
3.4 
4.0 
19.1 
24.3 
36.4 
9.0 
Current 
% 
3.5 
9.3 
14.3 
13.8 
29.8 
14.3 
Paid Without 
Arrears 
% 
11.7 
2.4 
7.3 
8.2 
1.5 
17.9 
Paid Without 
Arrears 
% 
25.1 
21.3 
30.4 
9.9 
4.3 
28.6 
w 
Vl 
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the farmers fall into late payments (arrears) to the barn::. However, it is important to note 
that these farm borrowers do in fact end up repaying a large proportion of their debt 
obligations to Banco Agricola, as seen in the relatively low hardcore default index for these 
borrowers in column (1). 
This raises the question of whether "bridge loans" to these processor intermediaries 
might not help aHeviate this problem. On the one hand, the bank could reduce the liquidity 
constraints facing these processor-marketers by granting them short-term loans, which in 
turn could allow them to pay their farmer suppliers on time. This would then allow these 
farm borrowers to repay the bank more promptly. On the other hand, the bank could grant 
loans to processors not only to cover their liquidity shortfall to purchase farm output, but 
an additional amount to in turn pass on as production loans to their farm suppliers they 
have contracted into their network. This would relieve the bank from the transaction costs 
of administering a large number of small farm loans and facilitate prompt repayment. 
These options, however, are based on the premise that the processor intermediaries 
would be responsible clients and the bank would behave as a disciplined lender effectively 
monitoring and collecting its loans. One suspects that the processors in the past have taken 
advantage of their farm supplier clientele to in effect command a liquidity leverage for their 
own use through delayed payments. They would be inclined to do the same to the bank if 
the bank's image as a lax loan collector is not improved. Therefore, any new policy 
emphasizing bridge loans to farmers through processor-intermediaries should not only 
anticipate the savings in transaction costs implicit in this approach, but also evaluate the risk 
of poor loan repayment from the intermediary itself. 
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Source of Funds Profile 
In Table 11 loan repayment is set forth by source of funds. As noted earlier 
government funds targeted to livestock activities (primarily the small livestock fund refer'ed 
A 
to here as the swine fund) records very high hard core default (column 1), with 64 percent 
of the number of loans in partial or complete default (accounting for 48 of the volume 
disbursed in this loan category). The international sourced FIDA funds allocated to small 
farmers also register very high default rates. 
At the other extreme are loans made from locally mobilized deposits. Here the hard 
core default is only 4 percent. Some 41 percent are paid up but with some arrears. This 
is, again, a reflection of the above mentioned marketing problem that affects loans from all 
sources. The important point is that all are eventually repaid. Own resources (i.e., capital 
base) has the next lowest hard core default rate (24 percent of the number accounting for 
12 percent of the volume disbursed). Finally, international sourced funds from the IDB, the 
World Bank, and AID (row three in Table 11) record an intermediate default index (32 
percent) between the default-prone government funds and the low default own source or 
savings account funds. 
An important finding underlined by these results is the generally poor repayment 
status (especially in terms of hard core default in Column 1) associated with funding sources 
that include targeting (i.e., international and government sources). In contrast, funds left 
free for branch level managers to allocate according to their own risk-adjusted criteria 
perform much better (i.e., own-source and savings accounts). This is a promising result. It 
indicates that if bank officials are given a broad mandate to grant loans in rural areas and 
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Table 11 
Repayment Status by August 30t~ 1989 of the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987 by Source of Funds 
A. Percentage of the Volune Disbursed 
Repayment Status of Sample of loans 
Volume In Resched- Paid \lith 
Disbursed Default Litigation uled Arrears Current 
Source of Funds (000) Pe- % % % % % 
sos 
1. Own Resource Fund 4394.59 11.7 - 2.3 34.2 14.9 
2. FIDE Fund 95.74 7.9 27.8 10.9 9.5 5.5 
3. International Fund 1404.38 32.3 - 0.4 28.3 22.9 
4. Swine Fund 1077.95 48.4 0.2 1.9 16.6 6.5 
5. Agrarian Reform Fund 1854.19 18.6 - 12.4 37.7 2.3 
6. Savings Account Fund 104.24 0.1 - - 49.9 1.0 
7. FIDA Fund 182.91 53.7 - 19.2 3.8 1.5 
8. Other 447.78 4.3 1.7 - 83.8 6.9 
B. Percentage of the Number of Loans 
Repayment Status of Sample of loans 
In Resched- Paid IJith 
Loans Default Litigation uled Arrears Current 
Source of Funds Disbursed % % % % % 
1. Own Resource Fund 767 24.4 - 4.3 35.2 9.6 
2. FIDE Fund 18 11.1 5.6 16.7 16.7 16.7 
3. International Fund 186 32.8 - 2.7 21.0 21.5 
4. Swine Fund 893 63.9 0.2 2.2 12.5 10.6 
5. Agrarian Reform Fund 195 41.0 - 17.4 25.1 5.6 
6. Saving Account Fund 24 4.2 - - 41.7 4.2 
7. FIDA Fund 131 74.0 - 19.1 3.8 2.3 
8. Other 32 34.4 3.1 - 40.6 9.4 
Paid 
\.tHh-
out 
Arrears 
% 
10.3 
17.1 
10.9 
12.2 
3.3 
42.4 
0.4 
1.0 
Paid 
Without 
Arrears 
% 
26.5 
33.3 
22.0 
10.4 
10.8 
50.0 
0.8 
12.5 
are free from detailed, client specific targeting, they can indeed behave like bankers and 
calibrate risks and returns to ensure viability. In short, viability requires autonomy in local 
level creditworthiness and loan management decisions. It is counterproductive for the 
government and international donors to presume to play this role through targeting criteria 
in the use of their funds. 
Among other things, these findings also emphasize the important role that locally 
mobilized deposits play in creating a more disciplined and responsible credit evaluation and 
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loan recovery effort. The reason is simple. Local depositors are a local constituency, close 
at hand and quick to react (through vocal complaints or deposit withdrawals) if they suspect 
bank officials are using their funds to service a growing set of delinquent borrowers. At the 
same time, bank officials are sensitive to the negative consequences of treating a depositing 
public lightly. Therefore, they are more careful and responsible in the loans they service 
with deposit-based funds. In summary, the greater the relative share of deposits in total 
funding, the lower the rate of default and the greater the viability of the lender. Conversely, 
the greater the share of international and government sourced funds, the greater the 
delinquent portfolio and the lack of institutional viability. 
Table 12 presents data on international donor sources in more detail. As mentioned 
before, FIDA funds register a dramatically high rate of default in number of loans (74 
percent) and volume disbursed (54 percent). The clientele serviced with these funds are 
clearly high risk customers (small farmers). More research is needed to determine the 
reasons for this unacceptably high rate of non-performing loans. World Bank loans also 
register a high rate of default. These are primarily for coffee and cacao producers who have 
been experiencing price penalizing policies through an overvalued exchange rate that 
reduces their earnings. 
IDB loans also register uncomfortably high arrears. The IDB loans are explicitly 
targeted to medium and small scale farmers, cattle ranchers or associations. No coffee, 
cacao, sugar cane, and tobacco farmers are allowed in the IDB portfolio. The medium and 
small scale farmers must currently meet three conditions: 
Source of Funds 
1. IDB Fund 
2. World Bank Fund 
3. FIDA Fund 
4. Rotating AID Fund 
Source of Funds 
1. IDB Fund 
2. World Bank Fund 
3. FIDA Fund 
4. Rotating AID Fund 
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Table 12 
Repayment Status by August 30th 1989 of the Sample of Loans 
Disbursed in 1987 by International Source of Funds 
A. Percentage of the Volume Disbursed 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
Vol1.111e 
Disbursed Paid With 
Default Rescheduled Arrears Current 
(000) Pesos % % % % 
798.33 38.7 0.2 22.4 23.9 
283.90 45.0 . 4.4 45.6 
182.91 53.7 19.2 3.8 1.5 
322.15 5.3 1.2 63.9 0.6 
B. Percentage of the Number of Loans 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
Paid With 
Number of Default Rescheduled Arrears Current 
Loans % % % % 
59 33.9 3.4 16.9 20.3 
61 50.8 . 3.3 44.3 
131 74.0 19.1 3.8 2.3 
66 15.2 4.5 40.9 1.5 
Paid 
Without 
Arrears 
% 
10.3 
0.1 
0.4 
21.9 
Paid 
Without 
Arrears 
% 
25.4 
1.6 
0.8 
37.9 
(1) Not have total agricultural assets (including inventories) higher than 190,000 
pesos for farmers and 360,000 pesos for cattle ranchers; 
(2) Not have a loan amount that exceeds 100,000 pesos; 
(3) Must be a new customer or qualify as excellent, very good, or good in pre 
loan credit ratings. 
The emphasis on new borrowers introduces an element of risk for the bank, since 
they have no previous experience or information upon which to base a creditworthiness 
analysis. The high risk, high delinquency profile previously discussed with respect to 
livestock loans suggests that these relatively more default-prone activities are also likely to 
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be a part of the IDB portfolio. The fact that some customers may have a good credit rating 
prior to the loan is no guarantee of good future repayment performance, especially if non-
performing loans are minimized as an important criteria in the IDB targeting scheme. This 
issue will be investigated shortly when we analyze the delinquency profile by credit ratings. 
The best performing donor sources of funds are associated with the recently created 
AID rotating fund, designed by the Ohio State Rural Financial Services Project.. It is of 
interest to note that these AID loans have no targeting criteria and, furthermore, require 
that no new tranches are issued to the bank until the bank repays past tranches back into 
the rotating fund. It is clear from these results that targeting is counter productive. The 
IDB, the World Bank, and FIDA could benefit from the AID experience by removing their 
targeting criteria in future dealings with the bank. They could also benefit along with the 
bank by requiring more timely reports on the loan repayment status of their portfolio (rather 
than asking for dubious "impact" studies on the borrowers). 
Profile of Borrower Credit Rating 
Tables 13 and 14 complete this discussion of loan repayment performance of Banco 
Agricola by presenting data on client credit ratings before loans are allocated to borrowers. 
In Table 13 we see that the bank has a realistic view of potentially problem-prone 
customers. For example, the targeted swine fund (small livestock loans), agrarian reform 
loans, and the FIDA clientele record very few customers with excellent, very good, or good 
credit ratings. A preponderant majority were "new" customers about which the bank knew 
little. Therefore, the high default rates recorded earlier for these borrowers are not 
Customer 
Credit 
Rating 
1. Excellent 
2. Very Good 
3. Good 
4. Fair 
5. New 
6. Defaulting 
8. No-rating 
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Table 13 
Profile of Borrower Credit Rating Characteristics of the Sample Loans 
Disbursed in 1987 by Soutte of Funds, by Number of l~ 
Sour<:~ of Funds 
Agrarian 
Loans Own FlOE Interne- Swine Reform Savi!'lg 
Disbursed Resources FUnd t i 01'\a l Fund Fund Accounts 
N % % % % % % 
190 12.47 20.00 27.33 2.69 9.74 70.83 
141 9.32 6.67 13.66 3.27 9.74 16.67 
302 24.93 20.00 18.01 5.61 17.95 12.50 
144 9.18 13.33 9.94 3.27 13.33 -
1212 41.23 13.33 27.33 81.52 42.05 -
84 3.70 26.67 4.97 3.74 7.18 4.17 
49 2.60 - 2.48 2.22 3.59 4.17 
Fll'lA 
F\lt'ld Ot!\er .. 
.. 
% % 
0.92 15. ,5 
2.75 12.12 
7.34 27.27 
6.42 12.12 
82.57 45.45 
1.83 -
-
. 
surprising. On the other hand, the bank rated 71 percent of their prospective clientele for 
deposit-based loans as excellent. Not surprisingly this clientele had by far the lowest default 
rates, thereby illustrating the consistency of the credit ratings. 
The most interesting finding from these two tables concerns the profile for credit 
ratings, on the one hand, and the profile for default, on the ·other hand, as it relates to 
international sourced loans. In Table 13 it is clear that roughly 60 percent of internationally 
sourced loans (i.e. World Bank, IDB, and AID) received high credit ratings (the first three 
categories) prior to the disbursement of loans. Yet, when we look at Table 14, we note in 
panel B that roughtly 49 percent of the customer credit ratings for excellent, very good, and 
good categories ended up in default. These are largely contributed by those high credit 
rating customers from international funds. In brief, the bank, though picking generally well 
rated customers for these international sourced loans, clearly did not exercise disciplined 
loan recovery efforts on these same customers once the loans were granted. Moreover, it 
is apparent that this incidence of lax loan recovery was associated with the IDB and World 
Customer 
Credit Rating 
1. Excellent 
2. Very Good 
3. Good 
4. Fair 
5. New 
6. Defaulting 
8. No Specified 
Customer 
Credit Rating 
1. Excellent 
2. Very Good 
3. Good 
4. Fair 
5. New 
6. Defaulting 
8. No Specified 
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Table 14 
Repayment Status by August 30th 1989 of the Sample of loans 
Disbursed in 1987 by Customer Credit Rating 
A. Percentage of the Volume Disbursed 
Repayment Status of Sample loans 
Paid 
Volume In With 
Disbursed Default litigation Rescheduled Arrears Current 
(000) Pesos % % % % % 
1297.50 7.9 - 2.5 55.7 14.9 
1069.47 5.2 - 3.2 51.3 27.1 
1479.05 8.4 1.8 4.7 51.3 10.8 
1631.98 17.2 0.5 2.3 17.0 3.0 
3088.36 29.8 0.1 3.1 26.7 13.1 
266.52 42.9 - 7.2 8.1 5.7 
234.02 11.9 - 38.8 12.4 5.2 
B. Percentage of the Number of Loans 
Repayment Status of Sample of Loans 
Paid 
In With 
Loans Default litigation Rescheduled Arrears Current 
Disbursed % % % % % 
190 13.7 - 5.3 44.2 8.9 
140 16.4 - 6.4 29.3 17.1 
301 18.6 0.3 6.6 30.9 11.0 
144 37.5 0.7 3.5 31.9 9.7 
1209 57.7 0.2 4.7 17.0 9.8 
84 52.4 - 7.1 4.8 9.5 
48 50.0 - 8.3 22.9 16.7 
Paid 
Without 
Arrears 
% 
11.2 
7.5 
13.3 
4.3 
9.3 
17.1 
0.2 
Paid 
Without 
Arrears 
% 
27.9 
30.7 
32.6 
16.7 
10.5 
26.2 
2.1 
Bank loans, since the AID loans registered a relatively low default index, shown in Table 
12. 
Two principal lessons can be drawn from this experience with international donors. 
First, targeted loans lead to a high delinquency. The targeted IDB and World Bank loans 
register much higher delinquency than the untargeted AID loans. Second, and most 
importantly, the IDB and the World Bank loan programs did not create the proper 
incentives to encourage responsible loan recovery effort. Performance requirements 
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emphasized targeting and, in the case of the IDB, the impact on the income of the 
borrowers. No signals were given to emphasize a low default rate. No requirements were 
established to report on the loan repayment status of their portfolios. In the face of this 
laxness on the part of these two international donors, the Banco Agricola behav~d in an 
equally lax fashion in its loan recovery practices. The recent AID loan program, on the 
other hand, explicitly emphasized good loan recovery, by requiring low delinquency before 
new tranches would be released through its rotating fund. 
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The Banco Agricola has been ill equipped to face the inflationary pressures stemming 
from the unstable macroeconomic environment of the Dominican Republic in the 1980s. 
Until recently, its failure to adjust total interest charges to reflect rising inflation eroded the 
real value of its interest income. At the same time, government and important international 
donor funds forced the bank through targeting criteria to incorporate high risk clientele into 
its portfolio, thereby contributing to a high default rate. The lack of economic incentives 
to become efficient led the bank to stagnate with respect to operational efficiency, 
technological modernization, and financial innovation. This problem has become most 
evident in the area of information management, since it is here where banking in general 
was developing most rapidly during the 1980s. The institution has maintained a highly 
centralized administrative structure, reflecting the degree of dependence on external sources 
of credit. Because these distorted financial incentives acted to arrest institutional 
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development, BAGRICOLA was ill suited to compete in the Dominican financial markets 
when the access to external funding finally dried up in the early 1980s. 
During the past four years the Bank has been forced to wage a highly public 
campaign emphasizing the liquidity problems faced by the institution in order to obtain 
funding from the Central Government. Although this strategy has been quite successful in 
extracting substantial financial support from the Central Government, this campaign has 
most certainly had a negative impact on deposit mobilization efforts, as well as introducing 
a high risk, default-prone clientele into the bank's portfolio through targeting schemes. 
The Banco Agricola is presently going through a significant institutional transforma-
tion. The implementation of deposit mobilization in 1984 as well as the lack of access to 
external loans from donor institutions has forced the institution to carry out significant 
internal reforms. During the last several years the Bank has invested heavily in information 
management, loan recovery, training, and deposit mobilization efforts. In addition, total 
interest charges on loans were raised from 18 to 30 percent towards the end of 1989, in 
response to recommendations by Ohio State, the USAID, and the IDB. Although still 
negative in real terms and somewhat below the commercial bank rates, this reform bas 
allowed the bank to become more competitive in its interest rate structure on deposits. 
Although some major reforms have been instituted, the bank has not clearly specified 
its strategic objectives as a development institution. There is still much confusion as to what 
the role of a development bank should be, and there continues to be some resistance within 
the bank itself to change. BAGRICOIA needs to prepare a strategic plan in which its 
objectives are clearly stated, along with the institutional reforms needed to accomplish these 
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objectives. The international donor and lending institutions can play an important role in 
the future development of this institution if they concentrate on supporting institutional 
reforms, rather than simply providing credit. Emphasis on targeting and impact studies at 
the beneficiary level must be abandoned, in favor of an overa11 policy which supports 
financial self-sufficiency of the institution. The reforms within the institution are not yet 
deeply entrenched and therefore there is the risk that any policy of international creditors 
which is not compatible with institutional viability could seriously undermine the gains 
obtained. 
The strategic plan should review the relationship between the Central Government 
and the Banco Agricola. The bank should no longer be expected to carry out the fiscal role 
of servicing the agrarian reform programs with which it has been saddled up to now. This 
fiscal role has seriously undermined the ability of the bank to carry out its primary role of 
financing national agricultural production. Furthermore, targeted funds to service high risk, 
default-prone small livestock activities, among others, have introduced an unacceptably high 
level of defaults into the bank's portfolio. This has contributed to operational losses, 
weakened staff morale, and compromised financial viability. 
The following recommendations should be considered in any new measures to deal 
with the bank's current state of institutional weakness: 
1. Elimate targeting from international donors and the Central Government. 
These actions introduce moral hazard into the bank's operation (i.e., induces 
the bank to accept high risk clientele and inculcates lax loan administration 
since all incentives are to push money quickly at all costs); 
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2. Change the strategic objective of the bank to emphasize financial viability; 
3. Support the bank to develop more appropriate default and arrears measures 
in a systematic tracking of its medium and long-term loan portfolio to capture 
installment repayments over the amount actually due, as well documenting 
deferred payments, and rescheduling of past due loans. Periodic reports on 
loan repayment status should form the basis for institutional performance; 
4. Finance continuing investment in hardware and training in software informa-
tion technologies so that the bank can systematically track its portfolio to 
meet the objectives set forth in (3) above; 
5. Eliminate all interest rate ceilings on loans and deposits to allow the bank to 
adjust to an inflationary environment and make appropriate risk-adjusted 
charges to new or high risk clientele; 
6. Encourage decentralization in bank operations so that branch managers can 
assume more responsibility for loan approvals and rejections. Staff evaluation 
should then take into account the manager's performance in creating and 
managing a low default portfolio; 
7. International donor funds should enter the bank in such a way as to not 
discourage local deposit mobilization efforts. This will create a healthier 
funding base as more local deposits from the general public grow as a 
proportion of total funding sources; 
8. Support the bank in efforts to identify feasible bridge loans where the bank 
can finance processor-marketing intermediaries rather than farmers directly. 
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Carefully constructed pilot projects could be tried out to determine which 
combination of intermediary-farmer network would prove more promising. 
It is important not to engage in overkill here. The bank should have the 
freedom to test several posible channels and terminate those that do not work 
out successfully. This should be a financial experiment to be administered 
within the capability of the bank personnel and information management 
system. It should not be a massive program that overloads the system. 
9. International donors should protect the bank's institutional viability (and the 
profitability of farming operations financed by the bank) by pressuring the 
government to remove interest rate ceilings, agricultural price controls, 
overvalued exchange rates, and other measures that compromise the financial 
viability of the bank and the bank's customers. It is important to deregulate 
price controls on agricultural produces (and overvalued exchange rates) at the 
same time that interest rates are deregulated so that bank clients can more 
easily repay higher interest charges. 
10. Encourage the government to undertake more efficient prudential regulatory 
reforms that can reduce the risks of moral hazard in the financial system. 
More effective bank examination procedures are required, honest and 
responsible reporting of the risks inherent in the financial management of the 
country's formal financial intermediaries are necessary along with carefully 
established rules for risk minimization in portfolio management and sanctions 
for institutions with unacceptable risk exposure. 
49 
As mentioned above, in the last several years BAGRICOLA has begun to undertake 
promising internal reforms in the face of serious liquidity shortages. The recommendations 
suggested above could greatly facilitate this process and allow the bank to approach the goal 
of becoming a more disciplined, self sustaining institution serving a responsible· rural 
clientele of depositors and borrowers. 

